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Abstract: In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants 
allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to 
local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish 
database containing information about the grants received by 617 
municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier 
governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting 
behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government 
during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote 
equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned 
municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional 
and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting 
them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer 
governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some 
political support, but that grants given to the opposition do not bring any 
votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from 
intergovernmental grants as the grantor. 
Keywords: Voting, parties, grants. 
JEL Codes: C72, D72. 
 
Resumen: En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias 
asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo 
político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la 
oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias 
recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de 
gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) 
durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las 
tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este 
período. Por tanto, podemos estimar dos ecuaciones de voto diferentes, 
analizando los efectos de las transferencias asignadas a municipios alineados y 
no alineados sobre el porcentaje de voto obtenido por el partido/partidos en el 
gobierno en las elecciones autonómicas y locales. Controlamos la posible 
endogeneidad de las transferencias instrumentándolas con el promedio de 
transferencias distribuidas por los diferentes niveles de gobierno. Los 
resultados sugieren que las transferencias asignadas a municipios 
políticamente alineados generan apoyo político, mientras que las 
transferencias asignadas a los municipios gobernados por la oposición no 
aportan ningún voto, lo que sugiere que el gobierno que asigna las 
transferencias y el que las recibe capturan el mismo crédito político de estos 
recursos. 
Palabras clave: Votos, partidos, transferencias. 
Clasificación JEL: C72, D72 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been a surge in the empirical literature that seeks to 
explain the political motives determining the allocation of intergovernmental 
grants and other public spending programs. For example, adopting the line taken 
by the theoretical studies of Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan 
(1998), the research undertaken by Case (2001), Strömberg (2007), Johansson 
(2003) and Dahlberg & Johansson (2004) provides some empirical evidence to 
suggest that more grants are allocated to jurisdictions in which the electors have 
been shown to be relatively indifferent to the incumbent and the challenger (i.e., 
there is a high proportion of ‘swing voters’). Some of these papers have sought 
to contrast this hypothesis with an alternative theory (derived from Cox & 
McCubbins, 1986) that claims that – if politicians are risk averse – funds will be 
allocated to those jurisdictions in which voters are clearly attached to the 
incumbent party (the ‘core supporters’). The results in Dahlberg & Johansson 
(2004) and Castells & Solé-Ollé (2005) suggest that the evidence in favour of 
this hypothesis is rather weak, although, as Rodden & Wilkinson (2004) point 
out, the task of separating the ‘swing voter’ and ‘core supporter’ hypotheses is 
not easy.  
 
However, this literature misses a fundamental point, which is especially 
important when dealing with intergovernmental transfers. The models used to 
date assume that the grantor government is able to get all the political credit 
arising from the allocation of a grant to a given jurisdiction. However, it often 
happens that the grant is allocated by the upper layer of government, but the 
project funded is implemented by the local government, who in this way can 
stand before the citizens as the main responsible for the expenditure. This is 
clearly not a problem for the grantor if the local government belongs to the same 
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party, but it can have adverse consequences when there is no partisan alignment, 
since the grants sent to a jurisdiction to improve electoral chances can actually 
improve those of the opposition. This argument has recently been proposed by 
Arulampalam et al. (2008) and Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007), who use it 
to obtain the theoretical prediction that grantors will allocate more grants to 
aligned local governments than they will to unaligned ones. The two papers 
present empirical evidence to support this hypothesis for India and Spain, 
respectively. In the Spanish case, Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007) show 
that municipalities aligned with an upper layer of government receive up to 40% 
more grants than those that are unaligned, a figure similar to that reported by 
Weingast et al. (2006) for Mexico. The Spanish results are robust across several 
specifications and, therefore, both the reliability and the size of the effect 
suggest that something important is going on. It is also worth mentioning that 
other papers –not making any specific statement about the behavioural reason of 
the finding– did previously find, for other countries, that ideology matters in the 
allocation of grants and other public programs (see, e.g., Grossman, 1994; and 
Levitt & Snyder, 1995).  
 
But while the evidence is compelling, nothing is known about the underlying 
motives that make grantors behave the way they do. As discussed above, papers 
by Arulampalam et al. (2008) and Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007) suggest 
that the answer lies in the ‘differential productivity’ of grants allocated to 
aligned vs. unaligned governments. Others, however, suggest that ‘clientelism’ 
is the reason of the biased allocation of transfers, non-aligned governments 
being punished by withdrawing transfers in order to force the population to 
dismiss the incumbent in the following election (see, e.g., Weingast et al., 
2006). Note that this second hypothesis requires much more rationality on the 
part of the voters, whose voting decision is based not on the retrospective 
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evaluation of monies received but on the expected future value of grants (which 
will be higher if there is alignment). Moreover, although the ‘clientelist’ channel 
cannot be totally discarded in Spain (see e.g., Cazorla, 1995), the low share of 
revenues funded by discretionary grants, and the fact that there are several 
grantors controlled usually by different parties (see section 3.1), suggest that the 
threat of punishment is not particularly great in Spain and that the first 
explanation (‘differential productivity’) is more plausible. Therefore, in this 
paper we will concentrate in finding direct evidence that grants allocated to 
aligned governments result in more votes than grants allocated to the unaligned 
ones. We believe there is real value added on this exercise, since we don’t know 
of any previous attempt to find evidence regarding this issue. 
 
Moreover, the data we use to test this hypothesis is particularly well suited to 
this purpose. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on 
capital grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from 
two different upper-tier governments (i.e., Regional and Upper-local) and 
municipal vote data on three electoral contests held during this period at the 
municipal an regional layers. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different 
vote equations that analyse the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned 
municipalities by different upper layers of government on the vote share of the 
incumbent party/parties at the local and regional elections. We account for the 
endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants 
distributed by upper layer governments. We focus our analysis on capital grants 
because these are grants that are earmarked for very specific purposes and that 
should  be solicited to the upper layer, which has some discretion in the 
selection of projects, meaning that political factors could play a role in its 
allocation. Note also that in the case of these capital grants both layers of 
government share the responsibilities for the service (e.g., the upper layer sets 
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the eligibility criteria and provides the funds, and the lower layer implements the 
project and co-funds). This means that both layers are seen by the voters as party 
responsible for the service, and suggests that the allocation of these grants is 
likely to respond to differential electoral productivity1. The results of the 
empirical analysis suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political 
support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, 
suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from 
intergovernmental grants as the grantor. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present a theoretical 
framework that will allow us to motivate the vote share equation to be estimated, 
and to interpret the coefficients obtained for the grants given to aligned and 
unaligned governments in terms of the ‘differential productivity’ hypothesis 
introduced above. The third section discusses carefully the econometrics of the 
exercise, focusing on the potential endogeneity of grants; to this end we use the 
theoretical framework developed in the previous section to guess the possible 
direction and magnitude of the bias and to propose a method to solve the 
problem. In the fourth section we briefly describe the institutional details of the 
Spanish case that will help to understand why we have adopted this particular 
empirical strategy. The concrete operationalization of the vote equation and the 
data used to compute the different variables are presented in the fifth section. 
The sixth section presents the results obtained. Finally, the paper ends with some 
conclusions and suggestions for further research on this issue. 
                                            
1 Nonetheless, it should be noticed that other studies (e.g. Arulampalam et al. 2008) find 
evidence that alignment do have an effect also on the allocation of unconditional grants. This 
could be due, for example, to widespread central regulations and/or to soft-budget constraint, 
which make voters think that the ultimate financial backer of the services is the central 
government. As we will argue at the end of the paper, whether co-partisanship has or not an 
effect on the allocation of different types of grants might be highly dependent on the details of 
each country’s federalist institutions. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
In this section we posit a very simple framework in order to describe how a 
voter decides his vote, depending on the alignment between the governments at 
different tiers. The approach used here is the same as that adopted in Solé-Ollé 
& Sorribas-Navarro (2007), who embed this behaviour in a model of electoral 
competition in order to derive implications regarding the effect of alignment on 
the amount of grants allocated. We first describe the basic set-up of the model: 
layers of government and parties. Then we describe how a voter determines his 
vote, depending on the alignment between governments at different tiers, and 
suggest how the vote equation could be specified in the empirical analysis. 
 
Basic set-up. In the model there are two upper-tier governments, each one with a 
jurisdiction covering the entire country, and a number of local governments. We 
will call the first tier R (Regional) and the second one U (Upper-local). For 
illustrative purposes, we assume that a different party controls each upper tier 
government: the R government by the right-wing party (r) and the U government 
by the left-wing one (l). Some local governments are controlled by the r party 
and some by the l party. The two parties, r and l, use the financial resources 
available at the tier of government they control to distribute grants to the local 
governments and advance their electoral prospects. Although each party controls 
a different government tier, and different elections are held at each tier, the 
model assumes that they are competing in the same electoral race, without 
specifying which specific election we are talking about2.  
                                            
2 This amounts to assume that politicians at all levels are interested in advancing the prospects 
of the party in general, and not only in winning the elections held at their particular layer of 
government. This may happen, if campaigns are highly centralized, if the electoral results of a 
party in a given election and jurisdiction are influenced by the results obtained in other 
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Voters’ behaviour. Voters vote on the basis of two criteria: (i) the welfare 
generated by grants, )( Jgu , with )(
'
Jgu >0 and )(
''
Jgu ≤0, and 
where UJ
R
JJ ggg +=  are per capita grants in municipality J, coming from R and 
U, respectively; and (ii) ideology. We define iX  as the ideological bias of voter 
i in favour of party l, which is unknown to the researcher; )( iJ XF  is a 
distribution of iX , with =)( iJ Xf  iiJ XXF ∂∂ /)( , which is common 
knowledge. There is an additional component in the voting behaviour which is a 
general popularity shock, Jδ , in favour or against the party in the R and U 
governments, which is municipality-specific (but common to all voters) and 
known before grants are determined. We assume that voter i votes for party r if 
Ji
U
J
R
J Xgugu δ+≥− )()( 3.  
 
Now we assume that the voting decision of voter i depends on the alignment 
status of her local government. Following Arulampalam et al. (2008), we define 
θ  as the proportion of utility from grants that the voter attributes to the local 
government and (1–θ ) as the proportion of utility from grants attributed to the 
grantor upper layer of government. If both layers are controlled by the same 
party, then all the utility from grants is captured by this party. If control is split 
between the two parties, then utility from grants must be shared. Nothing can be 
a priori said about the value of θ , which will be derived from the estimated vote 
                                                                                                                                        
contests, or if winning elections helps the party in rewarding its supporters through the 
allocation of posts. 
 
3 The voter will vote for r if the welfare gain obtained from r during the last term-of-office 
relative to the one obtained from l is higher than the ideological bias in favor of l: ΔuJr-
ΔuJl≥Xi+ δJ. This welfare gain is hypothetical and should be interpreted as the welfare 
increase derived from grants coming from the government controlled by that party compared 
to a situation in which all the grants came from the government controlled by the other party. 
It is only in this case that ΔuJr-ΔuJl  reduces to u(gJR)- u(gJU). 
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equation (see below). Thus, if the incumbent party at municipality J is r, i.e. J is 
aligned with R, voter i votes for party r if: 
 
443442144 344 21
l
U
JiJJ
r
U
J
R
J guXgugu
  by  captured  utility  by  captured  utility
)()1()()( θδθ −+>−+  
 
or,                                 iJ
U
J
R
J Xgugu >−−− δθ )()21()(          (1a) 
 
That is, expression (1) says that if the municipality is aligned with R, all the 
utility coming from grants allocated by R is captured by the party r but, since the 
municipality is not aligned with U, also a proportion θ  of the grants allocated by 
U is captured by party r. Similarly, if the incumbent party at municipality J is l, 
i.e. municipality J is unaligned with R, voter i votes for party r if: 
 
44 344 21444 3444 21
l
R
J
U
JiJ
r
J
R
J guguXgu
  by  captured  utility  by  captured  utility
)()()()1( θδθ ++>−−  
 
or,                                 i
U
J
R
J Xgugu >−−− δθ )()()21(  (1b) 
 
Expressions (1a) and (1b) suggest that grants from aligned upper layers of 
government have a much greater impact on the incumbent’s vote (in absolute 
terms) than grants coming from unaligned governments. In both expressions, 
grants coming from unaligned governments ( UJg  in expression (1a) and 
R
Jg  in 
(1b)) are interacted by the term (1-2θ ), which value is conditioned on the 
voter’s distribution between the grantor and the grantee of the utility derived 
from grants. The higher the proportion θ  of utility attributed to the local 
government is, the lower the impact of grants coming from unaligned 
government on the incumbent’s vote share is. 
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Vote share equation. Now we can combine these two expressions to write the 
vote-share for the incumbent party at, for instance, the regional government in a 
municipality, as: 
 
     ))()21()(( J
uR
J
aR
JJJ
R
J guguFv δθ −−−=      (2) 
 
where aRJg  and 
uR
Jg  are the grants that a local government receives from 
aligned and unaligned upper layers of government, respectively. Let’s assume 
that utility is linear in grants (i.e., JJ ggu  )( β= ) and define the dummy 
variables R
J
a  and U
J
a , which are equal to 1 if the regional and upper-local 
governments are politically aligned with municipality J. Now, from expressions 
(1a) and (1b) we can write the utility derived from grants in a municipality 
aligned and unaligned with the regional government as: 
 
     ))1)(21(( UJ
U
J
R
J
R
J gaga −−− θ    and    ))21)((1( UJURJRJ gaga −−− θ     (3) 
 
Adding these two expressions and grouping the variables according to the 
alignment status, the grants received from upper layers of aligned and unaligned 
government can be expressed as4:  
 
 UJ
U
J
R
J
R
J
aR
J g agag −=      and      UJUJRJRJuRJ )ga-(1g )a-(1g −=  (4) 
 
Although it is not absolutely necessary to derive our testable hypothesis, the use 
of a particular vote distribution for )( iJ XF  will help us to clarify it. For 
illustrative purposes, if we assume that )( iJ XF  is normally distributed 
                                            
4 Note that, since we assume that the regional government is always controlled by the right 
party and the upper-local one by the left party, we have UJRJ aa −=1  and URJ aa =− )1( , meaning 
that it holds that UJRJUJRJ aaaa −==− 1)1(  and RJUURJ aaaa −==− 1)1( .  
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(i.e., )( iJ XF  ∼ ),( 2σμJN ), being Jμ  a municipal specific mean of the 
distribution and 2σ  its variance, which for simplicity we assume constant across 
municipalities, the vote equation would look like: 
 
 J
uR
J
aR
J
R
J ggv ρβββ 321~ ++=  (5a) 
 
where JJJ δμρ +=  and )(~ 1 JJ vv −Φ= , )(•Φ  standing for the standard 
normal distribution, and where σββ  /1 = , )2(1 )/(2 θσββ −−=  and 
σβ  /13 −= . We could use an even simpler approach, assuming )( iJ XF  is 
uniform with mean Jμ  on the support JJ μμ +Ψ+Ψ− , . In this case the vote 
equation is: 
 
  3210 J
uR
J
aR
J
R
J ggv ρββββ +++=  (5b) 
 
where 2 /10 =β  Ψ=  /21 ββ , )2(1 )2/(2 θββ −Ψ−=  and Ψ−= 2 /13β . Note 
that the specification obtained is practically the same under both assumptions, 
with the exception that in the last case it is no longer necessary to apply any 
transformation to the vote share. 
 
It is important to stress that the results of both equations have the same 
interpretation and allow us to defend the specification of an estimable vote 
equation to test the hypotheses we made regarding the effect of partisan 
alignment on voter behaviour. Note that in both expressions (5a and 5b), if 
 01 >β  and 0.5<θ  then we expect 02 >β  and 21 ββ > , if 0.5=θ  then 
 02 =β , and if 0.5>θ , then  02 <β and 21 ββ > . That is, if  01 >β , grants 
to aligned municipalities buy votes in all feasible scenarios, but grants to 
unaligned municipalities might bring or detract votes depending on the 
distribution of credit between layers of government; if more credit is attributed 
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to the higher layer of government than it is to the lower layer (i.e. 0.5<θ ), these 
grants should also bring more votes (although less than grants to co-partisans); if 
credit is more or less equally split between layers (i.e. 0.5=θ ), grants to 
unaligned municipalities will neither bring nor detract votes; and if more credit 
is attributed to the lower layer (i.e. 0.5>θ ), these grants will detract votes 
(although the impact on absolute value will be lower than that of grants to co-
partisans). In the extreme case where the grantee does not keep any political 
credit (i.e. 1=θ ) grants will have the same effect on votes independently on 
whether they come from aligned or unaligned upper layers of government. 
 
Finally, note that a feature of the model is that the results of the elections to the 
upper tier of government do not only depend on the grants distributed by the 
level of government analysed, but also on the grants distributed by all levels of 
government. For instance, the vote-share obtained by the incumbent at the 
regional government in a municipality depends not only on the grants assigned 
by the regional government but also on those allocated by the upper local 
government. This is the result of our assumption that governments are interested 
in fostering the ‘general interests of the party’ and not only on winning their 
own election. Although this assumption is, of course, debatable, our results will 
allow us to test its validity.  
 
3. Econometrics 
 
The main problem in estimating a vote equation based on (5a) or (5b) is the 
possible endogeneity of grants. The issue can be described in terms of an 
omitted variable problem, since both the average ideological attachment of the 
population and the popularity shock of the government will be very difficult to 
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measure. For example, with  Jρ  omitted from (5a) the model estimated will be 
simply5: 
 
 J
u
J
a
JJ ggv ηγγγ +++= 210~      with      JJJ ερη +=  (7) 
 
where we add the Jε  i.i.d. term to the equation. Note that, whenever aJg  and 
u
Jg  
are correlated with Jρ , the coefficients  1ˆγ  and 2γˆ  will be biased (i.e., will 
differ from 1β  and 2β ). In our case this correlation is not just an empirical 
possibility, but can be a result of the theory. The paper by Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-
Navarro (2007), for example, departs from the vote behaviour as described in (2) 
to derive a prediction regarding the effect of alignment on the amount of grants 
received. They assume that the objective of each party is to maximize the 
expected number of votes taking the decision of the other party as fixed (i.e., 
Nash behaviour) and subject to a fixed budget constraint. The details of the 
analysis are referred to that paper; here it suffices to note that after analysing the 
F.O.C. they suggest that a specification such as the following might be 
appropriate: 
 
 J
a
JJ
a
J gfg ξλρλ ++=  )( 21  (8a) 
 
 J
u
JJ
u
J gfg ωλρλ +Ω−+=  )( 21  (8b) 
 
where )( JJf ρ  is the equilibrium cut-point density (i.e., a measure of the 
proportion of ‘swing voters’), which depends on the shape of the density 
function and on the value of the popularity shock, ag  and ug  are average per 
capita grants allocated to aligned and unaligned local governments, Ω  is a 
                                            
5 For simplicity, in this section in the expressions we omit the subscript that specifies the level 
of government analysed. 
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constant picking up the effect of alignment (unalignment),  1λ and  2λ  are 
positive coefficients, and Jξ  and Jω  are i.i.d. error terms. So, theory seems to 
suggest that popularity shocks (i.e., Jρ ) do have some effects on grants 
allocated, implying that there could be a possible omitted variable bias problem. 
The formulas for the bias of the estimated  1ˆγ and  ˆ2γ coefficients can be 
expressed as: 
 
  
   )/(
)./(
)ˆE(
222
2
222
1
2
1
11
ξρ
ρ
σσλσρλ
σρλβγ
++∂∂
∂∂+=
agJJ
JJ
f
f
 (9a) 
 
  
   )/(
)./(
)ˆE(
222
2
222
1
2
1
22
ωρ
ρ
σσλσρλ
σρλβγ
++∂∂
∂∂+=
ugJJ
JJ
f
f
 (9b) 
 
where 2ρσ , 2agσ , 2ugσ , 2ξσ  and 2ωσ  are the variances of the popularity shock, 
average grants distributed from aligned and unaligned governments, and error 
terms of equations (8a) and (8b), respectively. Note that the direction of the bias 
depends on the sign of JJf ρ∂∂ / . Suppose for a moment that this derivative is 
negative (i.e., the shock decreases the proportion of ‘swing voters’, something 
that happens on the right-wing side of the density function, once we assume F is 
symmetric and single-peaked as in Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007)); in this 
case, both coefficients are downward biased, since  1β is positive and  2β is 
expected to be negative or zero. Note also that the bias shall be in both cases of a 
similar magnitude, whenever 2agσ  and 2ξσ  in (9a) are similar to their 
counterparts in (9b) (i.e., 2ugσ  and 2ωσ ). This means than if  1β is higher (in 
absolute terms) than 2β , the OLS estimates of equation (7) should also give 
1ˆγ >  ˆ2γ . Note that if JJ ρφ ∂∂ /  is positive (i.e., the ‘shock’ increases the 
proportion of ‘swing voters’, something that happens on the left-wing side of the 
density function) then the coefficients are upward biased; however, it is also 
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plausible that the OLS coefficients say that 1ˆγ >  ˆ2γ when grants to aligned 
governments bring more votes than grants to unaligned ones.  
 
But although this is an interesting property, it only allows us to guess if our main 
hypothesis is valid (i.e., grants to co-partisans buy more support than grants to 
the opposition), without allowing us to obtain a more precise estimate of the 
degree to which credit for grants is transferred from the grantor to the grantee; 
for this we need to gauge the magnitude of the θ  parameter, an impossible task 
given the bias of 2γˆ . It would also be helpful to know something about the 
direction of the bias, but this depends on the sign of JJf ρ∂∂ / . If the density 
was symmetric and single peaked, and since we know that there is some 
incumbency advantage (see, e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007b), we can assume 
that most municipalities are on the right-hand side of Jf , meaning that 
JJf ρ∂∂ / <0. This would mean that there are some arguments to expect that the 
 γˆ coefficients are biased downwards. 
 
However, it would be much better to solve the endogeneity problem. Here we 
propose the use of an Instrumental Variables procedure. Note that expressions 
(8a) and (8b) already propose one instrument for each of our endogenous 
variables; these are simply the average per capita amount of grants distributed 
by aligned and unaligned higher layers of government (i.e., ag  and ug ). The 
intuition here is quite clear: municipalities belonging to regions where Regional 
and Upper-Local governments distribute huge amounts of grants will, in 
general, receive more transfers than municipalities belonging to regions where 
few grants are allocated to local governments. It can be argued convincingly that 
these two variables do not belong to the vote-share equation. Note that it is 
difficult to imagine that the effects of grants could spill over to other 
municipalities belonging to the same geographical area (i.e., receiving grants 
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from the same upper-layer governments) and controlled by the same party. 
Therefore, given that it is quite plausible that these instruments are not 
correlated with the error term Jη , their use will allow us to obtain unbiased 
estimates of the parameters of interest. Moreover, as will be checked in the next 
section, these instruments have a considerable explanatory capacity in the first-
stage regression, allowing us to avoid the problem of weak instruments.  
 
This procedure is similar to that adopted by Levitt and Snyder (1997) for the 
U.S. case. The only drawback faced by these authors is the impossibility of 
using over-identification tests to check the validity of the instruments. Although 
they acknowledge the presence of this problem, they believe that the theoretical 
justification of the instrument is sufficient to defend its validity. In our case, we 
will not rely exclusively on intuition to justify the instruments used. Note from 
(4) that both grants coming from aligned and unaligned grantors could be split in 
two different components. Similarly, we can divide each of our instruments ( ag  
and ug ) in two; for example, in the case of ag  we now have RJ
R
J
aR gag =  and 
U
J
U
J
aU gag = . By having two instruments for each endogenous variable, we 
are able to compute the Hansen overidentifying restriction test to check the 
validity of the instruments. 
 
4. Institutional background of Spain 
 
4.1. Layers of government and transfers 
 
Spain is a fiscally decentralized country with three layers of government: 
Central, Regional and Local. There are seventeen regional governments, the so-
called Autonomous Communities (ACs), which have very important spending 
responsibilities including, for example, the provision of health care, education 
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and welfare. Each AC is composed by one or more provinces. In the ACs 
composed by more than one province, there exists an upper-tier of local 
government, called Diputación, referred to here as Upper-Local. Although this 
upper-tier of local government has fewer spending responsibilities than the 
municipalities, which are the main players in the local public sector, allocation 
of grants for capital infrastructure to municipalities is one of their most 
important tasks6. 
 
Spain has over eight thousand municipalities although most are quite small. 
Municipalities are multi-purpose governments, with major expenditure 
categories corresponding to the traditional responsibilities assigned to the local 
public sector (environmental services, urban planning, public transport, welfare, 
etc.) with the exception of education, which is a responsibility of the regional 
government. Current spending is financed out of own revenues (2/3 approx.) and 
unconditional grants (1/3 approx.) which are allocated by a formula that makes 
their use difficult for pork-barrel politics. However, the funding of capital 
spending depends heavily on grants: in 2003, capital grants represented 13% of 
non-financial revenues and 44% of capital spending. These grants came from the 
three upper-layers of government: Central (15%), Regional (45%) and Upper-
Local (21%)7. Most of the grants take the form of ‘project grants’: there is an 
open call at regular periods (usually yearly) and the municipality must apply by 
submitting several infrastructure projects. These are evaluated in accordance 
with pre-established criteria (usually published in the call), but that are, 
nevertheless, subject to the interpretation of the grantor. Therefore, the degree of 
political discretion applied to these grants can be qualified as high. 
                                            
6 In ACs with only one province (there are six ACs of this kind), there is no Diputación, and 
its responsibilities are assumed by the regional government.  
 
7 The remaining 18% correspond to other sources (e.g., the EU) or to unclassified grants. 
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4.2. Elections and parties 
 
In Spain, central elections are usually held at regular four-year periods, although 
they can be called before the end of the term-of-office. Municipal and regional 
elections are held regularly every four years and on the same day in twelve out 
of seventeen ACs. In the period analysed, they were called one or two years 
before the general election. In the other ACs, elections were called before the 
end of the term and, therefore, were held on a different day. 
 
In the elections to the central and regional legislatures, the electoral districts are 
the provinces. A different number of representatives is elected in each province 
depending on its population size; candidates are included in parties’ closed lists; 
and the d’Hondt formula with a threshold is used to translate the number of 
votes into the number of representatives (Colomer, 1995). Therefore, the system 
is not entirely proportional and, in fact, it is much easier to win a seat in some 
provinces (rural areas) than in others. Due to the closed-list system, parties are 
highly disciplined, both inside the legislatures and (to a lesser extent) across 
layers of government. Since the party has a great influence on the future 
prospects of politicians (through the allocation of posts and places on the lists), 
they use to be loyal to the constituency but also to the party. 
 
In municipal elections closed lists are also adopted, the number of city 
councillors depends on population size, and the d’Hondt rule is also used, but in 
this case there is just a single district. As Colomer (1995) states: “these rules 
provide incentives for sincere voting and promote a high degree of pluralism in 
city councils”. As a result, there is a high proportion of coalition governments; 
for example, in the 1996-99 term 43.3% of the municipalities where governed 
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by coalitions (Solé-Ollé, 2006). Most municipal candidates are aligned along 
national or regional party lines. The local political system is seen as a first step 
in the process of recruitment into the regional and national political elite (Magre, 
1999). There are no specific elections to the assembly of the upper-tiers of local 
governments; the representatives of Diputaciones are elected on the basis of the 
results at the municipal elections. The votes for each party are aggregated across 
municipalities and the number of representatives is obtained, once again, by 
using the d’Hondt formula. These upper-tiers of government have been 
criticised on the grounds of their low level of electoral accountability: with few 
clear responsibilities and no need to go to the polls, politicians controlling this 
layer of government can use grants to foster the parties’ prospects at the next 
municipal election. 
 
The nature of the Spanish electoral and party system described above means that 
the elections held at each layer of government are not entirely independent of 
the national or regional political situation. In fact, parties follow the results of 
regional and municipal elections with great interest. Since these contests are 
usually held one or two years before the central elections, they provide an 
excellent occasion to test the real prospects of the party8. Therefore, although 
most efforts are focused locally, the parties do design a centralized (national 
and/or regional) strategy for these contests. This strategy includes statements 
regarding which regions and/or municipalities deserve greater campaign efforts9, 
                                            
8 This is due to the fact that national and/or regional political shocks do affect the results of 
these lower tier elections (see, e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2005, and Rodden et al., 2005, for 
evidence of this effect in Spain and other countries, respectively). In fact, local electoral 
results are seen as predictors of the parties’ prospects for the next general election.  
 
9 One year before the May 2007 municipal elections the newspaper El País published a report 
on the prospects for this contest entitled: “PSOE and PP open the battle town by town” and 
identified the regions and municipalities where each party would concentrate its efforts 
(source: El País, 23 April 2006, p. 26: “PSOE y PP abren la batalla pueblo a pueblo”). 
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either because the perceived electoral margin is low or because the region or the 
city is seen as having special significance in the eyes of voters (e.g., big cities). 
In the Spanish context, it is therefore natural to believe that just before an 
election, a party uses the various posts they control at different layers of 
government to allocate grants to pursue its electoral objectives. The high degree 
of partisan control exercised both inside and across layers of government 
facilitates the use of resources coming from different posts for the fulfilment of 
party interests. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1 Vote equations.  
 
The specification of our vote equation is built upon the results presented above 
in the theoretical section. Although the Spanish case described above provides 
us with three upper-tier grantor governments (Central, Regional and Upper-
Local), we will only analyse how the election results of the incumbent 
party/parties at the Regional and Local levels are affected by the grants allocated 
by the Regional and Upper-Local governments. We decided not to analyse the 
effects of central grants on the results of these elections and not to analyse the 
results of the general elections because these grants account for less money than 
the others and because the improvement of municipal infrastructure plays only a 
minor role in shaping the electoral agenda of the Spanish general legislative 
elections. This, however, is not the case of the regional and local elections, since 
the ACs, the Diputaciones and the municipalities are all responsible for the 
delivery of these services. Thus, we implicitly assume that the parties use the 
grants they control at the Upper-Local and Regional layers to influence the 
results of both the regional and the local elections. We do not analyse the 
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election results of the incumbent at the Upper-Local level, since, as it has been 
said, there are no direct elections to the Upper-Local governments. Its 
representatives are elected as a product of the results of the municipal elections.  
 
Thus, as starting point, we will estimate the following two equations: 
 
  RJt
mR
Jt
RR
Jt
RR
Jt gv εραβ ++=  (10a) 
 
  LJt
mL
Jt
LL
Jt
LL
Jt gv εραβ ++=  (10b) 
 
where  RJtv and LJtv  are the vote shares of the incumbent party/parties in the 
Regional (R) and Local (L) governments in the regional and local elections held 
at t, respectively; and RJtg  and 
L
Jtg  are the amounts of total capital grants per 
capita received by municipality J in the two years prior to election t. That is, 
R
Jtg  =
uR
J
aR
J gg +  and LJtg  = uLJaLJ gg + . The computation of these variables 
will be described bellow. This equation allows us to test whether capital grants 
do have any effect on the vote share. Note that this specification implicitly 
assumes that the grantee does not keep any political credit and thus, all grants 
have the same effect (i.e., increase the vote for the municipal incumbent), 
independently on whether they come from aligned or unaligned governments.  
 
Secondly, in order to test our hypothesis that is, that grants allocated to aligned 
governments result in more votes than grants allocated to the unaligned ones, we 
will estimate the previous equations, but decomposing the grant variable 
depending on whether they come from aligned or unaligned governments. This 
will allow us to infer the value of θ , i.e., the distribution of the political credit of 
grants among the grantor and the grantee. Thus, we will estimate the following 
equations: 
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The grant variable labelled with superscript a in expression (10c), aRJg , 
indicates the amount of money per capita received by municipality J in the two 
years prior to election t from the incumbent at the upper-local and regional 
governments with whom it is aligned, less –when not aligned with the 
incumbent at the level of government under analysis– the amount of money per 
capita received by municipality J from the layers of government with which it is 
aligned. Thus, aRJtg  is computed as: 
 
 UJt
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where RJta  and 
U
Jta  are equal to 1 if the regional and upper-local government are 
aligned with the municipal government, respectively. The grant variable labelled 
with superscript u in expression (10c) indicates the amount of grants per capita 
received by municipality J in the two years prior to election t from the upper 
level incumbent governments with whom it is unaligned. Thus, uRJtg  is 
computed as: 
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Note that although these expressions might seem rather complex, these 
calculations are nothing more than the transposition of expression (4) to a more 
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realistic setting10. The intuition behind the specification in (11) is that the 
electoral prospects of the incumbent at some high layer of government increases 
the more grants it is able to channel to aligned municipalities (coming directly 
from its budget or from the budgets of other layers of government also 
controlled by the same party) and the fewer grants other layers of government 
controlled by the opposition are able to channel to municipalities which are not 
aligned with it.  
 
It can be argued, of course, that this computation is overly complex, since voters 
might be able to disentangle the purpose of the different electoral contests and, 
therefore, only take into account the grants coming from the incumbent at his 
own election. In other words, and contrary to what expressions (11) and (12) 
might suggest, only Regional grants have some impact on the vote at regional 
elections but not Upper-Local grants. This means that politicians would not be 
able to foster the ‘general interests of the party’ (as we assumed in the 
theoretical section), using the grants at their disposal to influence elections at 
any layer of government, but rather they are forced to compete in only one 
election. To verify this possibility we will decompose expressions (11) and (12) 
into two different variables. So, we will have grants coming from aligned 
grantors computed separately for the Regional and Upper-Local grantor: 
 
 RJt
R
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10 Note that in the real world we should allow for UJRJ aa −≠ 1  and URJ aa ≠− )1( , since a local 
government can also be aligned or unaligned with both upper layers of governments. 
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and also grants coming from unaligned grantors computed separately for the 
Regional and Upper-Local grantor: 
 
 RJt
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Jt
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The four variables will be included in the equation. In the event that only (13a) 
is statistically significant, we should conclude that grants only have an effect on 
those elections at which the grantor is the incumbent, and not on elections held 
at other layers where the incumbent is not the grantor but one of his co-partisans 
at the other layers. 
 
When analysing the results at the local elections, the expression used to 
calculate the grants coming from aligned and unaligned governments are the 
following:  
 
 UJt
U
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These expressions are much simpler than the ones defined when analysing the 
results at the regional election, since the alignment variable is defined in relation 
to the incumbent at the level of government under analysis. Nonetheless, these 
expressions capture the same information. 
 
Note, finally, that the vote equations in (10a), (10b), (10c) and (10d) also 
include a term measuring the ideological attachment of the population and/or the 
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popularity shock experienced by the government, which differs from one 
equation to the other: mRJtρ  and mLJtρ . The m superscript means that these 
popularity effects are considered measurable. To account for them we include a 
set of proxies to be described below. Finally, these equations include an error 
term composed by an immeasurable shock and an i.i.d disturbance (e.g., 
R
Jtηρ += iRJtRJtε  ). As this popularity shock can be correlated with the amount of 
grants received (either from aligned or from unaligned grantors), we face a 
potential problem of endogeneity for which the use of instrumental variables is 
recommended, as argued in section 3.1.  
 
 
5.2. Data description 
 
Selecting the sample. We estimate the effects of grants on the municipal vote 
share obtained by the incumbent party/parties at regional and local layer of 
government. We use a rich database, which provides information about the vote 
share of parties at different types of elections and about the grants received by 
617 municipalities from different grantors during the period 1993-2003. Voting 
data come from information provided by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, in 
the case of the local elections, and directly from each of the Regional 
governments, in the case of the regional elections. The data on grants come from 
a survey on budget outlays conducted yearly by the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance. The initial number of municipalities was much higher (2,799), but we 
could not use the municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants due to the 
lack of socio-economic data, and we also lose some municipalities due to the 
lack of data on transfers by grantor. Moreover, we only use the municipalities 
that belong to a region where the Upper-Local government exists. However, we 
believe that despite this reduction in the number of observations the sample is 
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still representative of Spanish municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants, 
since we checked that the municipalities lost because of the unavailability of the 
breakdown in transfers are distributed proportionally according to population 
size and alignment status. 
 
Table 1. Definition of the variables, descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Description Mean 
(S.D) 
Source 
 RJtv  Vote share of the Regional incumbent party/parties at the regional elections in 
municipality J 
0.502 
(0.277) 
Ministry of Interior 
M
Jtv  Vote share of the Upper-Local incumbent party at the local elections 
in municipality J 
0.535 
(0.169) 
Ministry of Interior 
aR
Jtg  Capital grants from aligned upper-layers of government to municipalities 
aligned with the Regional government, 
per capita 
36.798 
(71.662) 
uR
Jtg  Capital grants from unaligned upper-layers of government to municipalities 
unaligned with the Regional 
government, per capita 
17.979 
(49.803) 
aM
Jtg  Capital grants from aligned upper-layers of government to municipalities 
aligned with the Upper local 
government, per capita 
41.699 
(64.436) 
uM
Jtg  Capital grants to municipalities from unaligned upper-layers of government 
unaligned with the Upper local 
government, per capita 
27.653 
(62.533) 
Coalition 
(Municipal) 
1 if coalition in Municipal govt. 
0 otherwise 
0.532 
(0.234)
First term-of-office 
(Municipal) 
1 if Municipal govt. in its first term, 0 
otherwise 
0.245 
(0.127)
Coalition 
(Regional) 
1 if coalition in Regional govt. 
0 otherwise 
0.267 
(0.442)
First term-of-office 
(Regional) 
1 if Regional govt. in its first term, 0 
otherwise 
0.709 
(0.454)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of 
Economics and 
Finance (grants) and 
Ministry of Public 
Administrations 
(alignment) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
Growth rate of per capita 
unemployment in the municipality  
-0.125 
(0.190) 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) & 
Anuario Social de 
España (La Caixa) 
Δ Population 
 
Growth rate of the population in the 
municipality  
0.034 
(0.089) 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
Δ Property tax rate 
 
Growth rate in the effective property 
tax rate: growth in nominal tax rate + 
growth in assessed value  
0.021 
(0.123) 
Property Tax 
Statistics ‘Centro de 
Gestión Catastral’ 
(Ministry of 
Economics and 
Finance) 
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Measuring votes: The vote variables are calculated as the share of votes 
obtained by the incumbent party/parties at the Local and Regional government 
in each municipality at the municipal and regional elections, respectively. To 
construct these variables we use the electoral results of the municipal and 
regional elections held in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003.  
 
Measuring grants. Our grant variables are capital grants (chapter 7 of the 
budget) coming from each upper layer of government (R and U). As we have 
already said, we only focus our analysis in capital grants, since their distribution 
is not formula based and, thus, they are more likely to be distributed according 
to their electoral productivity. Total grants are summed together for the last two 
years of each term-of-office and then divided by the population of the 
municipality at the beginning of these two-year periods, using data from the 
National Institute of Statistics (INE). We have assumed that grants received 
during the election year benefit the incumbent government and not the incoming 
one. We believe that this assumption is reasonable, given that municipal 
elections are generally held in the middle of the year (May or June) and that 
grantor governments usually exhaust their yearly grants budget early, just before 
the next election. Thus, we set out to explain the effect of grants on the electoral 
reward by examining the overall amount of grants received in 1994-95 for the 
term 1991-95, in 1998-99 for the term 1996-99, and in 2002-03 for the term 
2000-03. There are three reasons that justify this decision. The first one is the 
fact that in some ACs it is not always easy to identify alignment between layers 
of government given the different timing of regional and local elections. Thus, 
the alternative procedure of aggregating grants over an entire local term of office 
would have run into the problem of changing alignment in the middle of a 
period (since some regional elections are held at a date some time between local 
elections). The second reason is that by aggregating the grants variable over two 
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years, we reduce the volatility of this variable. The third reason is that, as the 
political cycle literature has emphasised, the temptation to use public funds to 
buy votes increases as the next election approaches, suggesting that the electoral 
reward will be higher in that time period11. 
 
Measuring alignment. As discussed in Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2007), 
the concept of alignment is straightforward when dealing with single-party 
governments. In such instances, a municipality is said to be aligned with an 
upper-layer grantor government if the party controlling the government at both 
layers is the same. However, in Spain a large number of governments (at all 
layers) are coalitions. Coalitions make the definition of alignment between 
layers more difficult. A party at a given layer of government may play at least 
three different roles: i) the single party in government, ii) the main partner or the 
leader of a coalition, and iii) a mere partner of the leading party in a coalition.  
 
As explained in the theoretical discussion above, the amount of grants 
transferred to municipalities belonging to each of these government types 
depends on the credit lost by the grantor government. If both layers are 
controlled by the same single party, no credit is lost, but when this party is the 
leader of a municipal coalition, part of the credit will flow to its local partner(s). 
If this party is a mere partner in the municipal coalition, the leading party may 
obtain a larger share of the credit. These considerations do not seem to depend 
on the status of the upper layer. For this reason, we have decided to use a 
dummy variable to identify the alignment status that is equal to one when either 
the single-party or the leader of the coalition in the municipal government is the 
                                            
11 See, e.g., Castells & Solé-Ollé (2005) for evidence indicating that pork-barrel politics in 
Spain intensifies as an election approaches. 
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same party as that in the upper layer of government (also a single party or 
coalition leader). Otherwise, this alignment dummy variable is equal to zero.  
 
To compute these measures of alignment, we use a database provided by the 
Spanish Ministry of Public Administration, which gives information about the 
party of the mayoralty and (in the case of coalitions) the other parties in the 
municipal governments, following the local elections of 1991, 1995, 1999 and 
2003. For the upper tier of local government, this database provides information 
about the party of the president and the composition of the assembly. Data 
regarding the party of the president of the AC and the other parties in the 
regional governments come from www.eleweb.com. In all cases, minority 
governments have been considered as coalitions. The party of the president or of 
the mayor is considered the Leader while the other parties in the coalition are 
considered as being the Partners. 
 
Control variables. In both vote equations we include variables that account for 
the ideological attachment of the voting population and for the popularity shock 
experienced by the incumbent prior to each election (i.e., termed mRJtρ  and 
mL
Jtρ in equations (10a) and (10b)). First, we include the lagged vote-share of the 
incumbent party/parties in order to account for the persistence of ideological 
attachments and popularity shocks. Second, to account for popularity shifts that 
have a differential effect on each of the parties at each election, we include a set 
of Election × Party and Election × Region dummies; we also tried with Election 
× Region × Party dummies, but adding the interaction of the party and regional 
dimension did not improve the fit of the equations significantly. Third, we also 
include certain government traits which might either be rewarded or punished by 
the voters. We include a dummy for coalition governments and a dummy 
reflecting whether it is the first term that this party is in the government or not. 
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A government is considered a coalition if the incumbent party had less than 50% 
of the seats. A government is classified as being in its first term of office if the 
party of the incumbent had changed between one four-year period and the next. 
We expect a negative sign for the first variable, indicating that voters dislike 
coalitions because of their inability to take decisions, and a positive one for the 
second one, suggesting that voters are more likely to give a second chance to 
new governments. Our expectations are based on previous results recorded in 
the Spanish municipal elections (see, e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007a and 
2007b). We also experimented with a more detailed breakdown of both 
variables, including dummies for minority governments and for those in their 
second and third terms-of-office, but these variables were excluded from the 
final regressions as they were not significant.  
 
Fourth, to account for the structural ideological attachment to some parties 
among voters in certain municipalities we include the average vote of the 
party/parties in all the elections held since 1979. Fifth, since this ideological 
attachment might evolve over time with a change in the socio-economic traits of 
the voting population, we also include the rate of unemployment and three 
population size dummies (i.e., smaller than 5,000, between 5,000 and 20,000, 
and bigger than 20,000) interacted with the party dummies. As we will explain 
in greater detail in the next section, these interactions were barely significant 
and did not alter our main results. Thus, we decided not to include them in the 
tables.  
 
Finally, we control for other variables that might have an impact on popularity, 
including the growth rate of per capita unemployment and population, and the 
increase in the property tax rate, which is the main municipal tax in Spain and 
previous papers have shown that it has a significant impact on the vote for the 
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party/parties in the local government (see, e.g., Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007a and 
2007b). The increase in the unemployment rate is included in both equations 
(local and regional elections). The population growth and property tax increase 
variables are included only in the case of the local elections, since in the eyes of 
the voters it is the local councils that are largely responsible for these matters. 
 
6. Results 
 
The results of the estimation of the effects of grants on votes for the incumbent 
are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Table 2 presents the basic results, that is, the 
effect of total grants on the vote share of the incumbent at the local government 
and their effect when allowing for a differential effect of grants coming from 
aligned or unaligned grantors. Table 3 reports the same results for the vote share 
at the regional government. In both tables, the first two columns show the OLS 
results and then the Instrumental Variable (IV) ones. Table 4 presents the results 
when allowing for a differential effect of grants depending on the grantee layer 
of government (Regional or Upper-Local). All tables estimate the linear version 
of the vote equation (5b), and use a limited set of controls. A discussion of the 
estimation of the non-linear version (5a) and the use of additional controls is 
included at the end of this section. 
 
Table 2. Effects of grants on the vote share of parties 
 in the Local government at the Local elections 
 OLS IV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Grants (×100 є),       
  total grants 0.013 (2.71)*** 
-.- 0.016 
(0.72) 
0.013 
(0.57) 
-.- 
  from aligned grantors (ga ) -.- 0.032 (6.26)*** 
-.- -.- 0.074 (2.37)** 
  from unaligned grantors (gu ) -.- -0.010 (-1.48) 
-.- -.- 0.031 (0.91) 
Lagged vote share  0.378 
(9.61)*** 
0.378 
(9.72)*** 
0.377 
(9.14)*** 
0.378 
(9.16)*** 
0.354 
(8.62)*** 
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Average vote share 
 
0.307 
(8.78)*** 
0.304 
(8.77)*** 
0.307 
(8.49)*** 
0.307 
(8.54)*** 
0.287 
(7.48)*** 
First term  0.041 
(4.00)*** 
0.044 
(4.32)*** 
0.041 
(3.95)*** 
0.041 
(3.98)*** 
0.040 
(3.98)*** 
Coalition -0.064 
(-7.21)*** 
-0.068 
(-7.78) *** 
-0.065 
(-5.69)*** 
-0.064 
(-5.60) *** 
-0.080 
(-6.37)*** 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.005 
(-1.03) 
-0.001 
(-1.07) 
-0.005 
(-1.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.91) 
-0.019 
(-1.13) 
Δ Population  
 
0.059 
(1.69)* 
0.060 
(1.65)* 
0.063 
(1.68)* 
0.058 
(1.65)* 
0.118 
(1.77)* 
Δ Property tax rate 
 
-0.014 
(-1.67)* 
-0.019 
(-1.68)* 
-0.019 
(-1.66)* 
-0.014 
(-1.66)* 
-0.002 
(-1.69)* 
Region × Election effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Party × Election effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.943 0.944 0.943 0.943 0.941 
F-stat. (zero slopes) 678.64 
[0.000] 
795.85 
[0.000] 
10322.52 
[0.000] 
10439.27 
[0.000] 
26244.54 
[0.000] 
F-stat. (zero Region × Election) 3.09 
[0.000] 
3.42 
[0.000] 
108.40 
[0.000] 
108.25 
[0.000] 
105.21 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party × Election) 2.77 
[0.000] 
2.50 
[0.000] 
49.47 
[0.000] 
49.09 
[0.000] 
47.34 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party × Election  
             + Region × Election) 
8.39 
[0.000] 
8.50 
[0.000] 
530.98 
[0.000] 
354.59 
[0.000] 
343.87 
[0.000] 
F-stat 1st stage excluded 
instruments -.- -.- 
39.04 
[0.000] 
21.65 
[0.000] 
131.05 
[0.000] 
Hansen  test (overidentification) -.- -.- -.- 0.750 [0.386] 
1.715 
[0.424] 
Hausman test (OLS ≠ IV) -.- -.- 0.89 
(2.01)** 
0.87 
(2.04)** 
3.25 
[0.039] 
No obs. 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 
Notes: (1) t statistics are shown in parenthesis and p-values in brackets; *, ** & ***: 
significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels; (2) Robust standard errors; (3) 
Dependent variable is the vote share of the party/parties in the local government in the local elections; 
(4) Hansen test for instrument validity, distributed as a ( )n2χ  with n = number of over-identifying 
restrictions (p-value in brackets). (5): The Hausman test is based on the residuals of the first stage 
regression. When there is only one instrument, we report the estimated coefficient of the residuals, 
otherwise the F-test of joint significance is reported. (6) Instruments used: [3]: g ; [4]: )(ULg L , 
)(Rg L ; [5] )(ULg aL , )(ULg uL , , )(Rg aL  )(Rg uL  
 
Table 2 shows, first, that total grants have a positive and significant effect on the 
incumbent’s vote share at the local elections, result that does not hold when 
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using IV. Second the results point out that the effect of grants is significantly 
different depending on whether they come from aligned or unaligned 
governments. Concretely, the OLS estimators conclude that grants from aligned 
governments, aLJtg , have a positive and significant impact on the incumbent’s 
vote share at the local election while those from unaligned governments, uLJtg , 
do not have any impact on the vote. These results hold in the case of the IV 
using average grants as instruments. The first-stage F-statistic of the excluded 
instruments suggest that the set of instruments used are jointly highly significant 
predictors in the first stage (they are much bigger than the threshold proposed by 
Stock and Yogo, 2003), and thus, they are not weak. Moreover, the value of the 
Hansen overidentification test indicates that the instruments are not correlated 
with the error term. These tests corroborate the validity of the instruments. We 
perform the regression based Hausman endogeneity test (Wooldridge, 2002), 
which corroborates that there is a problem of endogeneity. The IV coefficients 
are higher than the OLS. Thus, the OLS estimates seem to be biased downwards.  
 
Table 3. Effects of grants on the vote share of parties 
 in the Regional government at the Regional elections  
 OLS  IV  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Grants (×100 є),       
   total grants 0.004 (2.08)** -.- 
0.004 
(0.75) 
0.004 
(0.81) -.- 
  from aligned grantors (ga ) -.- 0.008 (3.35) ** 
-.- -.- 0.009 (1.68)* 
  from unaligned grantors (gu 
) -.- 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-.- -.- -0.001 (-0.25) 
Lagged vote share  0.428 
(12.05)*** 
0.420 
(11.90)*** 
0.428 
(12.10) 
0.428 
(12.12)*** 
0.417 
(11.72)*** 
Average vote share 
 
0.453 
(13.08)*** 
0.449 
(13.07)*** 
0.453 
(13.11) 
0.453 
(13.09)*** 
0.447 
(13.15)*** 
First term  0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Coalition -0.063 
(-5.69)*** 
-0.068 
(-6.26) *** 
-0.053 
(6.26) 
-0.086 
(-8.27) *** 
-0.056 
(-6.01) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.006 
(-1.29) 
-0.008 
(-1.39) 
-0.007 
(-1.28) 
-0.007 
(-1.27) 
-0.008 
(-1.40) 
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Region × Election effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Party × Election effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 
F-stat. (zero slopes) 1789.02 
[0.000] 
1452.33 
[0.000] 
3901.22 
[0.000] 
3987.24 
[0.000] 
2157.44 
[0.000] 
F-stat. (zero Region × 
Election) 
56.85 
[0.000] 
61.45 
[0.000] 
889.90 
[0.000] 
890.11 
[0.000] 
731.61 
[0.000] 
F-stat  
 (zero Party × Election) 
50.89 
[0.000] 
40.40 
[0.000] 
164.91 
[0.000] 
165.13 
[0.000] 
120.22 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party×Election   
             + Region × Election) 
49.79 
[0.000] 
50.56 
[0.000] 
1033.35 
[0.000] 
1034.01 
[0.000] 
1057.78 
[0.000] 
F-stat 1st stage excluded 
instruments -.- -.- 
129.90 
[0.000] 
66.06 
[0.000] 
128.49 
[0.000]] 
Hansen  test 
(overidentification) -.- -.- -.- 
0.401 
[0.526] 
0.342 
[0.558] 
Hausman test (OLS ≠ IV)   0.47 
(1.02) 
0.48 
(1.03) 
 0.983 
[0.375] 
No obs. 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 
   
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2): Instruments used: [4]: )(ULg R , )(Rg R ; [5]: , )(Rg aR )(ULg aR , )( ULRg uR +  
 
When moving to the analysis of the effect of grants on the vote share obtained 
by the incumbent at each municipality at the regional elections (Table 3), we get 
the same conclusions. That is, capital grants do buy votes, but only those coming 
from aligned governments. This results hold for OLS and IV estimators, and the 
estimated coefficients are quite similar. In fact, the Hausman test concludes that 
there is not an endogeneity problem and thus, OLS are the appropriate estimates 
here.  
 
Thus, these results suggest that grants to aligned municipalities have some 
impact on local and regional government incumbent’s vote share. The estimated 
coefficient for unaligned grants is zero: grants to governments controlled by the 
opposition do not result in a single additional vote. Therefore, our results 
confirm the ‘differential productivity’ hypothesis: grants to aligned governments 
buy more votes than grants to unaligned ones. This is due to the fact that in the 
case of unaligned grants, some political credit goes to the grantee, which is 
controlled by the opposition. In fact, our results suggest that the political credit 
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derived from grants is split equally between the grantor and the grantee. To 
understand this result, recall from expression (5b) that the coefficients of aligned 
and unaligned grants can be expressed as Ψ=  /21 ββ  and 
)2(1 )2/(2 θββ −Ψ−= , respectively, meaning that the findings  01 >β and 
 02 =β suggest that 0.5=θ . 
 
Table 4. Effects of grants on the vote share of  
Local and Regional governments. Breakdown by layer  
 
 Local elections Regional elections 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Grants (×100 є),      
          from aligned grantors (ga )     
               - Upper-Local grantor 0.042 (4.30)*** 
0.092 
(2.42)** 
0.006 
(1.97)** 
0.014 
(1.65)* 
               - Regional grantor 0.028 (4.55)*** 
0.045 
(2.02)** 
0.014 
(2.61)*** 
0.017 
(1.69)* 
          from unaligned grantors (gu ) -0.010 (-1.51) 
0.033 
(0.98) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.58) 
Lagged vote share  0.376 
(9.66)*** 
0.354 
(8.57)*** 
0.418 
(11.74)*** 
0.417 
(11.68)*** 
Average vote share 
 
0.304 
(8.77)*** 
0.283 
(7.26)*** 
0.450 
(13.06)*** 
0.451 
(12.86)*** 
First term  0.044 
(4.31)*** 
0.040 
(3.64)*** 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
Coalition -0.067 
(-7.80)*** 
-0.082 
(-6.47) *** 
-0.071 
(-6.61)*** 
0.012 
(1.07) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.001 
(-1.07) 
-0.003 
(-0.18) 
-0.008 
(-1.34) 
-0.009 
(-1.43) 
Δ Population  
 
0.062 
(1.65)* 
0.117 
(1.76)* -.- -.- 
Δ Property tax rate 
 
-0.012 
(-1.66)* 
-0.002 
(-1.67)* -.- -.- 
Region × Election effects YES YES YES YES 
Party × Election effects YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.944 0.940 0.990 0.907 
F-stat. (zero slopes) 749.13 
[0.000] 
25438.29 
[0.000] 
1542.88 
[0.000] 
802.15 
[0.000] 
F-stat. (zero Region × Election) 4.15 
[0.000] 
117.12 
[0.000] 
69.55 
[0.000] 
149.31 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party × Election) 3.27 
[0.000] 
49.15 
[0.000] 
53.15 
[0.000] 
987.15 
[0.000] 
F-stat  (zero Party×Election   
             + Region × Election) 
8.79 
[0.000] 
352.19 
[0.000] 
69.18 
[0.000] 
749.01 
[0.000] 
F-stat 1st stage excluded instruments -.- 90.62 [0.000] -.- 
69.52 
[0.000] 
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Hansen  test (overidentification) -.- 0.823 [0.364] -.- 
5.424 
[0.143] 
No obs. 1795 1795 1795 1795 
  
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2): Instruments used: [4]: )(ULg aL , )(ULg uL  )(Rg aL  )(Rg uL ; [5]: , 
)(Rg aR )(ULg aR , )(Rg uR , )(ULg uR  
 
The extended results are presented in Table 4 and reinforce our previous 
conclusions. All grants given to aligned municipalities have some impact on the 
two elections, while grants given to unaligned municipalities never have a 
significant impact on the vote. That is, the vote that the parties in the Regional 
government obtain at the local elections increases with grants if this 
municipality is controlled by the same party/coalition, and this is true for grants 
allocated by the Regional government as well as for grants allocated by the 
Upper-Local government (if controlled by the same party/coalition). Similarly, 
the vote obtained by parties in the Local government in a municipality increases 
with grants allocated by the Regional aligned governments as well as with grants 
allocated by the Upper-Local aligned governments. These results confirm the 
‘differential productivity’ hypothesis and provide some evidence (albeit that it 
should be interpreted with caution given the high standard errors) to support the 
assumption that upper-layer governments do care about the ‘general interests of 
the party’ and not just about the results obtained at their own election. Note that, 
in any case, the impact of Upper-Local grants is higher for local than for 
regional elections and that the impact of Regional grants is higher for regional 
than for local elections, meaning that it is better to try to influence the results of 
one’s own elections than those held at the other layer. This is quite reasonable as 
voters might be more able to make politicians accountable when they are being 
evaluated directly.  
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Note that the estimated effect of aligned grants on the vote share of the 
incumbent is higher at the local elections than it is at the regional ones. To give 
an interpretation to these values we have to make an assumption on the vote 
distribution function. For illustrative purpose, if we assume that it is uniform, 
100 € more in aligned grants from regional governments gives rise to an 
increase of 1.7% in the vote share of the parties in the regional government. This 
means that the expected vote shares with and without these grants would have 
been 50.2% and 51.9%, respectively. Nevertheless, our aim is not to compute 
the electoral productivity of grants, but to provide evidence that grants have 
different electoral productivity if they are assigned to aligned or unaligned 
municipalities.  
 
Thus, the results of the basic model (Tables 2 and 3) and those obtained from a 
breakdown by tier of government (Table 4), confirm our hypothesis. Moreover, 
in both cases, the explanatory capacity of the model is quite good, with an 
adjusted R2 that exceeds 0.9, and the results are robust to the inclusion in the 
model of a wide set of controls. First of all, note that the Party × Election and 
Region × Election effects, included in all the equations, are jointly statistically 
significant and play a major role in increasing the explanatory capacity of the 
model. The inclusion of Party × Region × Election effects did not increase the 
explanatory capacity of the model significantly and, therefore, was discarded. 
Second, the lagged vote share and the average vote shares of the parties in the 
government are also responsible for this high explanatory capacity. These results 
suggest that the election results at the municipal level are explained mainly by 
the structural attachment of the voting population to certain parties (average vote 
share), by the persistence of these ideological attachments and other popularity 
shocks (lagged vote share) and by regional popularity shocks that affect the 
electoral prospects of each party differently (Party × Election + Region × 
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Election effects). Third, there are also certain traits of the incumbent 
government that might be rewarded/ punished at the polls. The results suggest 
that coalition governments are punished, while first term governments are 
rewarded (see also Bosch & Solé-Ollé, 2007a, for previous evidence of these 
effects). 
 
Fourth, the other controls (growth in unemployment, population and taxes) have 
the expected sign in all cases. In the case of unemployment, although the results 
suggest that its increase harms the re-election prospects of incumbents at all 
layers of government, this effect is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Population growth has a positive and significant impact on the vote for 
the municipal incumbent, while it is affected negatively by property tax 
increases, although these effects are only significant at the 90% level. These 
results are very similar to those obtained in previous studies (see, e.g., Bosch & 
Solé-Ollé, 2007a and 2007b). In the case of property taxes, these papers found a 
stronger and significant negative effect, but only after instrumenting this 
variable, something that we did not do here as it is not our main variable of 
interest. 
 
Finally, we made several robustness checks. First, we have re-estimated the 
equation by adding interactions between the rate of unemployment and 
population size dummies and the party dummies. The results suggest that left-
wing parties typically have better results when unemployment shrinks but the 
standard errors are quite high; the results regarding population size interactions 
are quite difficult to interpret. Overall, all those interactions add very little 
explanatory power to the equation and do not have any influence on the grant 
coefficients, and so we decided not to report them. Second, we also have 
estimated a vote equation where the vote share of the incumbent has been 
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transformed as )(~ 1 JJ vv
−Φ= , )(•Φ  standing for the standard normal 
distribution (see expression 5a). Although the point estimate of the coefficients 
is not directly comparable to that of the linear equation (5b), the results are 
qualitatively similar: grants to aligned municipalities have a positive effect on 
the vote and grants to unaligned municipalities do not bring any votes. Third, we 
have re-estimated the vote equation with different definitions of alignment: 
considering a government aligned also in those cases where the party at the 
municipal layer (either a single party or coalition leader) is a mere coalition 
partner at the upper layer (thus expanding the definition of alignment), 
considering also those cases where the party is a local partner (thus, further 
expanding our definition), and only considering as aligned those cases in which 
a single party fully controls both layers (thus restricting our definition). The 
results are practically indistinguishable from those presented here, and so any 
attempt at interpreting them would be mere speculation.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to test the ‘differential productivity’ hypothesis which 
claims that grants assigned to municipalities controlled by co-partisans buy more 
votes than those assigned to municipalities governed by opposition parties. In 
order to do so, we use a rich Spanish database which provides information on 
the capital grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 
from two different upper-tier governments (i.e., Regional and Upper-local) and 
municipal vote data on three electoral contests held at each of these layers 
during this period. Therefore, we have been able to estimate two different vote 
equations that analyse the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned 
municipalities on the share of the vote obtained by the incumbent party/parties at 
the regional and local elections. The results suggest that grants given to co-
 40
partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties 
do not bring any votes.  
 
The implication of this result is, according to our theoretical model, that the 
grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the 
grantor. We believe that this result is quite plausible given that we are analyzing 
project grants in which, although the grantor acts as financial backer, 
considerable work is required from the grantee both during the allocation stage 
(i.e., project submissions) and subsequently during its implementation. It is 
common in this type of projects that the grantor makes efforts to communicate 
to the voters that he is the one actually paying for the infrastructure (e.g., trough 
the use of placards or by organizing an inauguration ceremony), but these efforts 
use to be matched by the grantee who uses similar strategies (e.g., appearances 
in the local media emphasizing their role in obtaining external funding). It is not 
strange, therefore, that the voter typically apportions credit equally to both 
parties, grantor and grantee. However, it is important to stress that our results 
cannot be generalized to all grants and neither to all countries. The feasibility to 
distribute grants according to their electoral productivity is conditioned to the 
institutional framework an on their design. 
 
Therefore, according to our results, the partisan use of grants has its roots in the 
low ability of the voter to properly assign credit to the different layers of 
government and this is caused at the end by an unclear division of 
responsibilities between layers and by the earmarked finance of projects which 
are the responsibility of local governments. This sort of ‘partial 
decentralization’, where upper-layers not only fund local services but also put 
many conditions on the use of funds (e.g., approve the projects), could lead to a 
dysfunctional working of federalism has been recently recognized by some 
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scholars (see, e.g., Devajaran et al., 2007). These authors even suggest that 
‘partial decentralization’ could foster rent-seeking. We have not gone so far in 
this paper, but acknowledge than in some stances earmarked financing could 
facilitate ‘partisan clientelism’ of the type described Weingast et al. (2006), 
since non-aligned municipalities could see its projects subsequently rejected by 
the grantor until opposition parties are replaced at the local election. It is our 
purpose to investigate this possibility in the future, trying to ask which of the 
two hypothesis (i.e., ‘differential productivity’ and ‘clientelism’) has more 
explanatory power and under which circumstances would each type of behavior 
be more prevalent. 
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